University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

11-18-1965

Muktarian v. Barmby
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Muktarian v. Barmby 63 Cal.2d 558 (1965).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/597

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

[Sac. No. 7544•.In Bank. Nov. 18, 1965.]

EDWARD S. MUKT ARIAN, as Executor, etc., Plaintiff and
Appellant, v. ROBERT B.A.RMBY, Defendant and Respondent.
II] Quieting '-'itle - Defenses - Statutes of Limitation. - A
father's action against his son to quiet title to real property
deeded to the son by the father allegedly as the result of an
error as to the father's intention was not barred by the threeyear statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proe., § 338, subd. 4),
despite the fact that the father discovered the error on the day
following execution of the deed but took no action until more
than three years had elapsed, where the father was in possession of the property during the entire time title was in dispute; no statute of limitations runs agaitist a plaintilf seeking
to quiet title while he is in possession of the property.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Quieting Title and Determining Adverse
Claims, § 25; Am.Jur., Quieting Title and Determinntion of Ad,'('rse Claimll (1st cd § 63).
Melt. Dig. Reference: [1) Quieting' Title, § 36.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County. Elvin F. Sheehy, Judge. Reversed.
Action to quiet title to real property. Judgment for defendant, on motion pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 631.8, reversed.
Carl Kuchman and Edward S. Muktarian for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Archibald M. Mull, Jr., Bill Holden and Michael S. Sands
for Defendant and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In September 1961 William E. Barmby
brought this action against his son to quiet title to certain
real property. At the close of plaintiff's case, defendant
moved for judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 631.8. The trial court concluded that the action was
barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to
actions for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake (Code
Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. 4) and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. 1
In late 1947, at age 75, plaintiff married for the second
time. Defendant, seeking to prevent the second wife from
acquiring certain of plaintiff's property, .urged plaintiff to
deed the property to him. On December 15, 1947, plaintiff
and defendant went to the law offiees of Mull & Pierce to
execute the deed. Defendant gave no monetary consideration
for the deed, and although the trial court found a confiden-tial relationship between the parties, it also found that defendant made no false representations with respect to the
deed and exerted neither duress nor undue influence. It further found, however, that the "deed . . . and the recording
thereof _ _ • were contrary to the intentions in the mind of
plaintiff at the time of executing said deed. "
The deed is labelled "GRANT DEED" and purports to
convey the property to defendant subject to a life estate in
plaintiff. The trial court found that "the day following the
execution of said deed plaintiff discovered from the firm of
Mull & Pierce the error as to his intentions as grautor in the
granting clause and the recording of said deed." It is not
lWhile 'his appeal was pending, William E. Barmby died. and his
uecutor was substituted as plaintiff and appellant. For convenience,
however, we will refer w WipilUU E. Barmb)' as plaintiff.
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disputed that at all times after executing the deed plaintift
remained in possession of the property and paid the taxes on
it. According to uncontradicted testimony, he talked with a
lawyer in 1960 about clarifying defendant's rights under the
deed, but after the lawyer discussed the matter with defendant, no further action was taken. In the same year, plainti1f
sold three acres of the property, and defendant signed the
grant deed. When defendant refused to discuss a proposed
sale of 52 acres, however, plaintiff brought this action.
[1] Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in holding that the three-year statute of limitations governing actions based on fraud or mistake bars his action. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 338, subd. 4.) Since there is no statute of limitations
governing quiet title actions as such, it is ordinarily necessary to refer to the underlying theory of relief to determine
which statute applies. (See, e.g., Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal.
2d 195, 214 [1 Ca1.Rptr. 12, 347 P.2d 12, 77 A.L.R.2d 803]
[relief dependent on rescission of a contract, rule requiring
prompt action applies] ; Kenney v. Parks, 137 Cal. 527, 530
[70 P. 556] [nondelivery of deed, Code Civ. Proc., § 318
applies; failure of trust condition, Code Civ. Proc., § 343
applies] ; Estate of Pieper, 224 CalApp.2d 670, 689 [37 Cal.
Rptr. 46] [nondelivery of deed, Code Civ. Proc., § 343 applies] ; Turner v. Milstein, 103 Cal.App.2d 651, 657-659 [230
P.2d 25] [extrinsic fraud, Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. 4,
applies].) In the present case, however, it is unnecessary to
determine which statute would otherwise apply, for no statute of limitations runs against a plaintiff seeking to quiet
title while he is in possession of the property.2 (Smith v.
Matthews, 81 Cal. 120, 121 [22 P. 409] ; Faria v. Bettencourt,
100 Cal.App. 49, 51-52 [279 P. 679]; 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) Actions, § 111, p. 613; 41 Cal.Jur.2d, Quieting
Title, Etc., § 25, p. 493; see Newport v. Hatton, 195 Cal. 132,
145 [231 P. 987]; Sears v. County of Calaveras, 45 Ca1.2d
518, 521 [289 P.2d 425] ; see also, Berniker v. Berniker, 30
Cal.2d 439, 448 [182 P.2d 557].) In many instances one in
possession would not know of dormant adverse claims of persons not in possession. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954)
Actions, § 111, p. 613.) Moreover, even if, as here, the party
in po!!Session knows of such a potential claimant, there is no
lIn holding that the defendant had pleaded the wrong statute of
limitations. Keflfl/,Y v. Par'ka, 137 Cal. 527, 530 [70 P. 556J. did not need
to decide and properly did not discuss whether any statute runs against
a plaintiff while he is in possession of the property.
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reason to put him to the expense and inconvenience of litigation until such a claim is pressed against him. (See Berniker
v. Berniker, supra, 30 Ca1.2d at p. 448.) Of course, the party
in possession runs the risk that the doctrine of laches will bar
his action to quiet title if his delay in bringing action has
prejudiced the claimant. (Stewart v. Rice, 30 Cal.App.2d
335, 340 [86 P.2d 136] ; see DaSilva v. Reeves, 215 Cal.App.
2d 172, 175 [30 Cal.Rptr. 81] ; see also Berniker v. Berniker,
supra, 30 Ca1.2d at p. 448 [7].) In this case, however, the
trial court erred in holding that plaintiff's action was barred
by the statute of limitations and thus did not reach the question of laches.
The judgment is reversed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J.,
and Burke, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December 15, 1965.
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